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COMMUNICATION  FROM  THE  COMMISSION  TO  THE  CQUNCIL 
AND  THE  EUROPEAN  PARLIAMENT 
THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN  RADIOACfiVE SllBSTANCF.."i 
AND  NUCLEAR MATERIALS INTRODUCfiON 
The dissolution of the Soviet Union has resulted in the fragmentation of the centralized 
control and management structures for nuclear materials and radioactive substances.  The 
whole of the Soviet nuclear industry was subject to  a system of security specific to  the 
existing regime, but the stringent controls and physical security rules which were part of 
this  system have now been  considerably  relaxed.  The  highly  centralized  system  was 
based  on  completely  different  criteria  from  those  applied  in  the  West  (absence  of 
accounting  for  nuclear  materials,  for  example),  and  on  almost  total  interpenetration 
between civil and military activities. 
This  dangerous  situation  has  become  more  acute  because  a  number of States  in  the 
region,  particularly  Russia and  Ukraine,  have  undertaken  an  ambitious  programme of 
dismantling their nuclear arsenals, sometimes with huge support from the West, with the 
indirect result of a growing risk that certain fissib materials might move from  an  area 
subject to control to less well-controlled areas where malicious acts cannot be ruled out. 
This  combination  of elements  is  helping  to  promote  an  illicit  traffic  in  dangerous 
radioactive materials, fraudulently acquired and resold secretly. 
The  emergence  in  certain  republics,  including  Russia,  of  very  powerful  criminal 
organizations adds to the risks of diversion.  Such organizations could take advantage of 
the situation and establish export channels.  In addition,  where this traffic is conducted 
by  organizations rather than isolated individuals, experience shows that the networks in 
question have branches throughout the entire world, and that the potential final  users of 
the stolen  materials are  in  all  probability  third countries or clandestine operators based 
outside the territory of the Union. 
This factor, which could endermine the security of States and individuals in Europe, calls 
for  an  overall  response  from  the  Union.  It is  clearly  in  the  common  interest of the 
countries of the former Soviet Union, the Central and Eastern European countries and the 
Luropean Union that a solution be found. 
The joint work that needs to be embarked upon will  make it possible to give firm shape 
to  certain aspects of the rapprochement between the European Union and Eastern Europe 
through  partnership  with  the  Commonwealth  of Independent  States,  and  in  particular 
l{ussia and Ukraine, and through the Europe Agreements with  the Central  and Eastern 
l :uropean countries.  Stability in Europe cannot be achieved without such joint approaches 
and practical  cooperation. 
lhe aim of this communication is  to  draw attention  to  the gravity of this problem and 
suggest some ways in  which  it  can  be  tackled effectively  and systematically, using the 
\ arious instruments at the disposal of the European Union and its Member States. 
2 L  THE ILLICIT TRAFFIC IN  RADIOACTIVE SUBSTANCES 
AND NUCLEAR MATERIALS 
1.1  BACKGROUND 
For obvious geographical reasons, there is a risk that the territory of the Union could 
increasingly become the hub for this dangerous trade. A number of attempted transactions 
of this sort have been blocked in time by the competent authorities of the Member States, 
mostly in Germany.  Some cases have also been reported in Switzerland and Austria. 
The materials concerned are generally of  no interest in military terms, even if  they present 
a real  contamination hazard. However, a few cases of illegal possession of plutonium, a 
highly dangerous material which can be used for military purposes, have come to light 
recently, spectacularly raising the level of public awareness of the scope of the problem 
and the dangers of the situation. 
The dangers inherent in  this trade are considerable. The risk of radiation, which varies 
according to the material involved, exists for those who handle the material but in  some 
cases there is  also a risk for the general public. 
As  far  as  traffic in  the most dangerous  substances is concerned, such  as  plutonium or 
highly  enriched  uranium,  there  is  also  a  risk  of nuclear  proliferation,  since  nuclear 
materials involved in  this traffic are not only of interest to States or organizations which 
are seeking to  by-pass the various levels of control set up  at national and international 
!;~vel. 
A note recently sent to  the Council by  the German delegation (No 7861/94 of 16  June 
1994) reports a large increase in the number of recorded cases of illicit traffic in nuclear 
or radioactive materials. The document quotes the figure of 41  cases in  1991, 15 8 in  1992 
and 241  in  1993. 
An  even  greater  source  of  ~mxiety  are  two  cases  reported  in  May  and  July  1994 
concerning  materials  capable  of being  used  for  military  purposes,  namely  plutonium 
seized  in  Germany  and  enriched  uranium  intercepted  in  St.  Petersburg.  The  major 
seizures by  the German authorities in  August were given considerable media publicity, 
and undoubtedly highlighted the need for a rapid and effective response to  this problem. 
For the moment, the illicit presence of uranium and plutonium has been reported only in 
liermany  and  Italy.  Other  less  serious  cases  involving  radioactive  materials  such  as 
caesium  137,  which  is  used  in  hospitals,  have  also  come  to  light  in  Germany  and 
!lelgium. The vast majority of cases recorded so far are concerned with radioactive substances and 
not nuclear materials. Experience shows, however, that the people guilty of this traffic are 
sometimes not aware of the real  nature  of what  they  are transporting.  In  other cases, 
dealers have simply tried to pass off relatively innocuous substances as material of high 
value, the price being in  direct proportion to the potential danger of the stolen material. 
An  important  distinction  must  be  made  between  the  legal  frameworks  governing  the 
materials in question.  Simplifying somewhat, a distinction can be made between: 
-nuclear materials, which are materials subject  to "safeguards" (safety controls), whether 
under  the  Euratom  Treaty,  the  International  Atomic  Energy  Agency  (IAEA)  or  the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), and in regard to which there is a substantial risk, 
according to  the substance in  question, of direct or indirect military use. 
These  materials  (for  example,  plutonium  or  highly  enriched  uranium)  are  the  most 
dangerous and, in addition to the danger of contamination, they present a threat in terms 
of nuclear proliferation; and, 
- radioactive  substances,  which  are not  subject to  safeguards and  regarding  which  the 
threat of contamination derives from the radiation emitted by the substance, but without 
the possibility that the substance can  be used  as  a fuel  in its present state.  This  is  the 
case, for example, with certain substances commonly used for medical purposes. 
As used in the Euratom Treaty, the term "safeguards" refers to a set of measures designed 
to  ensure  that  nuclear  materials  are  not  diverted  from  their  intended  uses,  with  the 
implication  that  any  diversion  would  be  for  military  purposes,  and  implementing  at 
Community  level  the obligations incumbent on  the Member States as  a result of their 
international commitments. The question of safeguards is thus quite different from  that 
of nuclear  safety  (safety  of design  and  operation  of nuclear  insta1lations),  radiation 
protection (protection against the harmful effects of radiation), environmental protection, 
etc. 
4 1.2  INVOLVEMENT OF THE COMMISSION 
Since March  1992 the Commission has been involved, at the initiative of the Member 
State concerned, in handling numerous cases involving attempted illegal transactions. 
The Commission's Euratom Safeguards Directorate (DG XVII-E), based in Luxembourg, 
and the Joint Research Centre's Institute for Transuranium Elements, based in Karlsruhe, 
have been closely involved in tackling the problem. 
As far as  safeguards are  concerned, Chapter VD of the Euratom Treaty states that the 
Commission shall  satisfy  itself that,  in the  tenitories of Member States, ores,  som-ce 
materials and special fissile materials an~ not diverted from their intended uses as declared 
by  the  use~. 
To  this end the  Commission established the  Euratom Safeguanls Directorate (ESD) in 
Luxembou~ as  palt of the Directorate-General for Energy. 
This Directorate has a body of specialist nuclear inspecto~ who are responsible for on-
the-spot checks to ensure that nucleru· mate1ials for civil purposes in the possession of the 
800 or so  installations in the Union are not diverted from their declared uses. 
lne units of the ESD are  responsible for: 
- auditing the materials held by  installations, mainly uranium, plutonium and thorium; 
- negotiations  with the  Member States  and  the  International  Atomic  Ene•-gy  Agency 
(IAEA) in Vienna; 
- dischm-ging  the  Commission's obligations unde•· the  bilateral agreements between the 
IAEA and the two Member States of the Union which have a nuclear capability and the 
Agreement between Euratom, the non-nuclear weapon Member States and the IAEA; 
- devising control strategies,providing computer back-up, and developing and installating 
monitoring instruments. 
For a broader and detailed view of the activities of the Safegumtls Directorate, the reader 
should  refer to  the  n~cent report on the  operation of Em""atom  safeguards  1991-1992 
(COM(94)282 of 6 July 1994). 
It should also be emphasized that, under the Euratom Treaty, the Commission is required 
to establish the legislative basis at Community level for radiation protection for the public 
and workers exposed. 
Given  the  enormous  dangers  involved  in  illicit  handling  or  the  discharge  into  the 
environment  of  radioactive  substances  or  materials,  under  Council  Directives 
80/836/Euratom and 80/467/Euratom, the Member States are required to introduce health 
protection measures to  ensure that the maximum limit values for radioactive doses and 
intakes are not exceeded. 
*** 
By  way  of illustration of the Commission's involvement in these cases, we can refer to 
a typical case from March 1992 which represented the start of  the collaboration described. 
5 Here the Bavarian police arrested four  people trying to  sell  1.2  kilos of low enriched 
uranium in  a car park near Augsburg. 
The  competent  authorities  immediately  asked  the  Commission  to  assist  them  m 
identifying the materials and where they  came from. 
An  inspector from Luxembourg then went to the scene with the necessary  instruments, 
and the uranium was finally conveyed to Karlsruhe where detailed analyses were carried 
out.  The JRC  was able to identify the origin of the materials and the evidence provided 
by  the officials was crucial in the prosecution of the persons arrested. 
The collaboration took place to the satisfaction of all concerned, with the result that the 
German authorities proposed to formalize it, and this was done by an exchange of letters 
between the German Permanent Representation and the Directorate-General for Energy. 
These  letters  describe  methods of communication,  coordination  and  analysis,  and  the 
organization of contacts between the various authorities and institutions involved. 
*** 
1.3  THE ROLE OF THE JOINT RESEARCH CENTRE 
The Institute for Transuranium Elements in Karlsruhe has the necessary resources for the 
reception  and  handling  of all  samples  containing  radioactive  substances  or  nuclear 
materials.  In  addition,  it  possesses  instruments  capable  of analysing  the  radioactive 
properties and isotopic composition of fissile elements. 
These analyses make it possible to evaluate in particular the mass of fissile elements, the 
nature of the treatment they have undergone and the date thereof. 
From the information provided by these analyses, such as the degree of purity, and by 
comparing this information with data in the Institute's database, the JRC is frequently able 
to determine the origin of these materials, the reactor for which they were prepared, and 
the installation in which the materials were treated. 
In  all  the cases in  which samples have been forwarded to Karlsruhe, it was possible to 
establish  a  full  identity  sheet  for  the  materials,  including  possible  uses,  and  precise 
information was sent by  the JRC  to  the Commission Safeguards Directorate and to  the 
national authorities in the cases referred to. 
This information naturally  constitutes vital  assistance for police and judicial enquiries, 
and,  generally speaking, for any  organized action to  combat this traffic. 
*** 
6 1.4.  THE NEED FOR A COORDINATED, COHERENT RESPONSE 
It is therefore clear that the situation is ripe for what could be very dangerous traffic on 
the territory of the Union. 
The current situation clearly indicates that the present level of safety controls in certain 
newly independent States is quite inadequate, given the quantities of dangerous products 
located on  their territory.  This means  that  there  is  a  major  risk  of contamination,  m 
particular by plutonium, caesium and other radioactive substances. 
The  effect of this information on  public opinion  may  be considerable  in  view of the 
technical nature of the  subject and the  difficulty  which  sometimes exists in  evaluating 
correctly and rationally the risk of contamination. 
The opening of internal  frontiers  means that  what  constituted a specific danger for  a 
limited number of Member States,  for  geographical  reasons,  is  now becoming a risk 
throughout the Union's territory. 
The  Council  Wooong Party  on  Atomic  Questions  displayed  a  major  interest  in  this 
problem at an early stage. The question was raised several times and a preliminary report 
from the Commission's departments was presented in June  1993.  This report described 
the  ad  hoc  procedures  set  up  between  the  Commission  and  the  authorities of certain 
Member States to try to tackle the problem. 
Since this report was produced, the working party has stated several times that it was in 
favour  of a joint approach  to  this  problem.  The  document  already  quoted  from  the 
German delegation reached the same conclusion. 
The Working Party on Non-Proliferation also considered the matter on  l  September. 
"l he  question  which therefore arises  is  what type of strategy  could be adopted by  the 
Union and the Member States to prevent this worrying problem from escalating. 
Gtven  the  gravity  and  specific  nature of the  risk  arising  from  this  traffic,  everything 
should be done to  maximize the preventive impact of any  measure taken at national or 
t Inion  level. 
lhe Commission considers that a response at  Union  level  would be better suited to  the 
scope of the problem and therefore more effective. 
l"he  Union already has at  its disposal  a wide range of instruments which could be  used 
to combat this illicit trade. This integrated approach must involve the three "pillars" of the 
Communities,  a  common foreign  and security  policy and  cooperation  in  the  fields  of 
justice  and  internal  affairs,  an  approach  already  developed,  for  example,  in 
communications relating to  immigration and asylum, and in  the European Union action 
plan to combat drug abuse (1995-1999). 
7 These instruments could be grouped together under three main headings: 
A.  Improvement of the operating conditions of the local nuclear sectors; 
B.  Cooperation with the States concerned; 
C.  Cooperation between the Member States of the Union. 
* 
*  * 
2.  TilE INSTRUMENTS  FOR A EUROPEAN RESPONSE 
A.  IMPROVEMENT  OF  CONDIDONS  IN  TilE NUCLEAR SECTOR  IN  TilE 
COUNTRIES CONCERNED 
It is clear that in the medium term the problem can only be resolved by an improvement 
in  the  economic and political conditions of the countries concerned.  In the short term, 
however, action focusing on the control of  their nuclear industries should produce positive 
results. 
It is  essential that the nuclear industry should restore an adequate level of control, and 
that a strict materials accounting system be reestablished, so that the authorities of the 
States from which the materials originate are able to cooperate fully with those of transit 
countries in  particular in  the fight against this traffic. 
Unlike the measures mentioned under point C below, for example police cooperation, the 
forms of cooperation described below are more concerned with prevention. 
It should be noted that the situation with regard to safeguards systems in the Central and 
Eastern  European  countries is  much  better than  in  Russia and the newly  independent 
republics, including the Baltic States. 
The Commission is contributing towards efforts to set up safeguard systems by supplying 
specialized technical assistance. This cooperation is being organized for the Commission 
by  the  Euratom  Safeguards Directorate and in  the  context of the technical  assistance 
programmes (T ACIS) with the help of the Joint Research Centre. 
8 1.  COOPERATION IN THE FIELD OF  SAFEGUARDS 
A cooperation programme to restore a reliable safeguards system has been set up by the 
Euratom  Safeguards  Directorate  and  the  Russian  Federation.  The  programme  was 
launched in  1992 and formalized in  1993. 
The aim of this programme is to help design, establish and implement a strict system for 
the control  and accounting of nuclear materials.  The programme is  already operational 
and is starting to show concrete results. 
The cooperation is primarily geared to the Russian Federation and complements action 
by the IAEA in the same field, in particular in so far as the Vienna Agency refrains from 
taking action in States with a military nuclear potential except at the express request of 
the State in question. 
The initial phase of  this cooperation focuses on the training of  inspectors and the drawing 
up of operational concepts in the field of safeguards. 
A number of seminars have been organized and Russian  experts have been invited to 
work temporarily in Luxembourg to gain familiarity with control methods. The aim is to 
help  the  experts  to  develop  a  satisfactory  safeguards  system,  while  supplying  direct 
logistical  assistance  (documentation,  computers,  etc.).  Russian  experts  have  also 
accompanied Euratom safeguards inspectors in  on-site visits, thanks to the cooperation 
of the Member State authorities concerned. 
This first phase of cooperation will  cost a total  of ECU  1. 5 million for 1993  and  1994 
under budget heading B 4.2001. 
In a second phase, starting in 1995, specific projects concerned with the establishment of 
national and installation-level nuclear control and accounting systems are to be launched. 
These projects are already at the study stage and relate to  three main fields,  namely: 
- collection, processing and evaluation of information; 
- inspection procedures and implementation thereof; 
- accounting for materials in  each  installation. 
The budget heading in question has so far been allocated a token entry ("p.m.") for 1995. 
*** 
2.  COOPERATION IN THE FRAMEWORK OF TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE 
The Commission has included in  the T  ACIS  programme a project aimed at helping to 
establish more reliable safeguard systems, with the technical support of  the Joint Research 
Centre. 
At  present  cooperation concerns the three republics pursuing major nuclear activities: 
Russia,  Ukraine  and  Kazakhstan.  In  Ukraine  and  Kazakhstan,  the  projects  have  been 
launched  in  close  cooperation  with  the  Swedish  authorities  and  mainly  concern  the 
training of local authorities and operators. 
9 As far as Russia in particular is concerned, the projects and ideas put forward by the JRC 
aim to ensure coherence in  the action by  the Community. 
The  main  thrust  of JRC  cooperation  is  concerned  with  training  for  future  Russian 
inspectors and operators.  The setting up  of a safeguards system will  call for the use of 
several hundred persons by the authorities and operators. The success of the first aspect 
will therefore also depend on establishing a training infrastructure in Russia. 
In the Community, training of Euratom inspectors is mainly provided at the JRC, which 
has also  trained operators in  the past and continues to  do  so  for third countries at  the 
request of the IAEA. This second aspect would have to be very much the responsibility 
of the  JRC,  given  that  there  would have to  be  complementarity with  the ESD  action 
described above. 
The visit to  Ispra of two senior officials from the atomic  energy ministry ("Minatom") 
and the national inspection service ("GAN") produced very encouraging reactions and has 
resulted in ambitious projects in keeping with the challenge which the Russian authorities 
are facing. 
The particular importance of these contacts is that they  involve the authorities directly 
responsible for installations where thefts of materials could have taken place. 
The setting up of a training centre in Obrinsk (south of  Moscow), under the responsibility 
of Minatom but also  accessible  for  GAN  inspectors,  is  under  consideration.  It would 
benefit from existing infrastructures and would contribute to the installation and operation 
of a modem nuclear material accounting and control system at national and installation 
levels. 
The existence  and  effectiveness of such  a system  is  a prerequisite to  stop  any  further 
smuggling and,  moreover, it  would enable  many  Russian  military  experts to  use  their 
expertise in  civil activities. 
The  JRC  would provide technical support for  the projects and provide training for the 
trainers, with the assistence of European Union industrial operators who have already said 
that they  are very much in  favour of such collaboration. 
During  their  first  visit  to  Ispra,  the  Russian  authorities  raised  the  question  of 
instrumentation, equipment and reference materials for materials controls. In the official 
minutes of the visit, the Russians called for the establishment of cooperation with the JRC 
in  order to  develop the  instruments available in  Russia.  Given the urgency,  equipment 
could  also  be  supplied both to  the  future  training  centre  and  in  the  context of direct 
assistance to  the authorities.  The JRC  has every  intention of meeting these  requests in 
close collaboration with the European Union industrial operators who have said that they 
are very much in favour.  The arrangements for financing the project as  a whole will  be 
examined in  detail. 
A  complementary  element  in  this  cooperation  could  be  the  establishment  of a  pilot 
installation,  as  completely  theoretical  training  would  not have  the  desired  impact.  In 
addition, the logical complement to the training centre would be the existence of at least 
one installation which fully complies with internationally recognized rules on safeguards 
in  the  widest sense of the term. 
10 The  basic  idea  would  be  to  choose  a  fuel  cycle  installation  and  perform  a  retrofit 
programme, as  is  done for  reactors  under the TACIS  programme.  A Russian operator 
would be the beneficiary here and his cooperation would be required. The task would thus 
fall  primarily to industrial operators within the Union.  However, because of the size of 
the  task,  cooperation  with  third  partners,  in  particular  the  United  States,  could  be 
envisaged. The recent events show the necessity to  accelerate this technical assistance. 
The JRC is also interested in Ukraine and Kazakhstan.  An initial training programme has 
been organized for five future inspectors in each State. This type of cooperation should 
be continued and expanded, but it is also clear that the real  needs of both republics are 
huge and go beyond the financial possibilities which are currently available. Other forms 
of funding are being looked at. 
*** 
3.  INTERNATIONAL SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY CENTRE 
The Moscow-based International Science and Technology Centre (ISTC) was set up  by 
an international agreement to  which the European Union is  a contracting party.  Its aim 
is to prevent the proliferation of technologies and knowhow relating to weapons of mass 
destruction (nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and missile-launching systems). It 
seeks  to  minimize  the  possible  incentive  for  scientists  specializing  in  these  areas  to 
contribute towards such proliferation by offering them the opportunity of redirecting their 
expertise to peaceful activities, such as  civil  scientific research projects. 
The Centre has been fully operational since March  1994.  A hundred or so  projects have 
been submitted to  the ISTC's Governing Board, 55  of which, with a total value of over 
ESD 30  million,  have  already  been  approved,  and  some  of these  have  already  been 
carried  out.  The  aim  of one  of them  is  to  establish  a  safeguards  system  for  nuclear 
materials  in  complex  installations.  Other  projects  concerning  materials  controls  are 
envisaged in the future. 
As  can  be seen,  despite its rather different objective, the  ISTC  can  make  an  important 
medium-term contribution to  the overall effort to  combat traffic in  nuclear materials. 
* 
* * 
II B.  COOPERATION WITH TilE COUNTRIES CONCERNED 
Active  cooperation  from  the  countries  concerned,  i.e.  the  countries  from  which  the 
materials involved in the illicit traffic have been stolen, is clearly essential if efforts to 
combat such traffic are to  succeed. 
The Commission therefore takes the view that in order to resolve this problem there is 
also a need for constructive dialogue with the countries concerned, in particular Russia. 
Given  the  very  high  level  of expertise  of scientists,  engineers  and  authorities  in  the 
Russian  nuclear sector, there is  considerable mutual benefit in  stepping up  cooperation 
between  Russia  and  the  Union,  both  between  industrial  operators  and  between  the 
competent authorities. 
Cooperation  could  also  take  a  bilateral  form,  as  part  of association  or partnership 
aga~ements concluded or to be concluded with the countries in question, and a multilateral 
form, and in connection with the efforts to  renew the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 
in the context of joint action by the European Community. 
Use of the  Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE)  in  this  context 
could also be looked at. 
In  addition,  there  could  also  be,  if necessary,  contacts  and  cooperation  with  other 
countries which are concerned by  the problem. 
l.  COOPERATION IN THE EXISTING CONTRACTUAL FRAMEWORK 
In  addition to  the technical assistance already  described, the European Union can make 
use of dialogue and cooperation opened up  by: 
- the partnership and cooperation agreements  with Russia and some of the  republics of 
the CIS;  . 
- the Europe Agreements concluded with the six Central and Eastern European  countries. 
These agreements provide  for political dialogue and offer possibilities for specific forms 
of administrative cooperation, in particular on  the basis of existing protocols relating to 
administrative assistance on customs matters which enable there to be active cooperation 
between the authorities concerned, with a view to combating illicit traffic. 
The fight against nuclear proliferation is  a major objective for the European Union, and 
an  in-depth  dialogue  has  already  been  set  in  motion  with  the  Central  and  Eastern 
European  countries on  these  issues.  It could be  beneficial  to  supplement this  dialogue 
with discussions on specific aspects. 
The  partnership  and  cooperation  agreements  will  complement the  technical  assistance 
currently provided, both politically and through the technical cooperation opportunities 
they provide. 
12 With regard to  the future  agreements  with the Baltic Republics and Slovenia, and the 
partnership and cooperation agreements to be negotiated with other CIS Republics, two 
lines of action should be explored for the future: 
- firstly,  the  insertion  of specific  clauses  based on  provisions  in  the  existing 
agreements relating to drugs and the laundering of proceeds; 
- secondly,  taking  as  a  model  Article  84  of the  cooperation  and  partnership 
agreement with Russia, the use of the general provisions on the prevention of 
illegal activities, including fraudulent transactions involving nuclear materials 
and radioactive substances. 
Up to  February 1994 the Commission was negotiating an  agreement with Russia on the 
trade  in nuclear materials. The negotiations were not wholly  successful  in  as  much  as 
outstanding issues were finally resolved in the context of the partnership agreement. This 
is only a temporary solution, however, since the agreement states that a text specifically 
relating to the nuclear trade will  be the subject of a separate agreement, as  intended at 
the  outset.  The  draft  nuclear  agreement  contained  useful  provisions  on  safeguards, 
physical  protection  and  administrative  cooperation  which  could  be  taken  over  in  the 
additional agreement to be negotiated. 
During discussions on  the interim agreement to  be  concluded with Russia pending the 
entry into force of the partnership agreement, Russia proposed the inclusion of  provisions 
on cooperation on  the prevention of illicit acitivities.  Since this form of cooperation is 
essentially the responsibility of the individual Member States, the Russian proposal has 
not  so  far  been  accepted.  The  partial  inclusion  of certain  specific  areas  could  be  a 
possibility. 
The  Commission  recently  asked  the  Council  for  authorization  to  negotiate  bilateral 
nuclear  cooperation agreements with  Kazakhstan,  Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,  Ukraine  and 
Uzbekistan which would also include such provisions. In addition, in its proposals for a 
new  Union strategy  vis-it-vis  Ukraine, the  Commission emphasized the  urgent need  to 
Improve the quality of nuclear activities. 
;\s regards  radiation  protection, it  should  be  pointed out that, where the  international 
t.·an~port of materials is  concerned the  Convention on  physical  protection  requires  its 
stgnatories to apply physical protection measures plus sanctions. Euratom and the Member 
~tates, Russia,  Bulgaria,  Hungary,  the  Czech  and  Slovak  Republics  and  Rumania are 
parties to  this  convention.  In addition,  voluntary guidelines have been  adopted by  the 
Vienna Agency. 
Moreover,  in  order to  guarantee the  protection of the public against radiation hazards, 
there would have to  be a firm  commitment from the various authorities responsible for 
r tdiation protection and,  if necessary, the means for increased cooperation with them. 
It  should  also  be  pointed  out  that  Council  Directive  89/618/Euratom  concerning 
information for the public provides for prior information (Article 8) and information in 
emergencies (Article 6).  The Commission  could examine  with  the  competent national 
authorities  in  the  Member  States  the  possibility  of including  the  illicit  traffic  in 
radioactive materials in  this directive (Article 2.2). 
13 The possibility  should also  be examined of helping to  launch  publicity  campaigns  in 
Russia to inform the general  public of the  risks of holding dangerous  materials.  Such 
publicity  could also contribute indirectly towards the successful  stamping out of illicit 
practices. 
*** 
2.  COMMON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY 
The aim of  joint action based on the guidelines of  the Corfu European Council, confirmed 
by the July General Affairs Council, is to strengthen the international system of nuclear 
non-proliferation by promoting the universality of  the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in 
particular by  extending it on an  unlimited and unconditional basis. 
Accession by  a State to the NPT implies that the State agrees to conclude an agreement 
with  the  IAEA  which  provides  for  the  application  of safeguards  to  all  the  nuclear 
activities pursued on the State's territory (''full  scope sqfeguards regime'l This involves 
the  setting  up  of a  national  safeguards  system  with  the  objective  of monitoring  the 
application of this agreement. 
The joint action approved by  the Council  provides explicitly for  the possibility of the 
European Union assisting States which, desiring accede to the NPT, face the obligation 
of setting  up  control  procedures.  This joint action  therefore  constitutes  an  instrument 
which, among other things, helps to  combat the illicit trade in nuclear materials. 
The European Union could examine in this connection whether new measures should be 
proposed to deal  with this problem. 
*** 
3.  COOPERATION WITH CERTAIN THIRD COUNTRIES 
Other States outside the Union have also voiced their concern at the risks associated with 
the  illegal  trade  in  nuclear  materials.  They  have  initiated  various  kinds  of action  to 
provide assistance to  the  competent authorities of the CIS  republics concerned, and to 
intensify the prevention of all  forms of criminal activity. 
This assistance is either channelled by  an  international organization (IAEA) or based on 
bilateral cooperation. 
In the latter connection, mention can be made of Sweden which, in close liaison with the 
JRC, has undertaken assistance projects in Ukraine and Kazakhstan, and the United States 
which  wishes  to  combine  its  efforts with  those of the Union  and the  Member  States. 
Following a preliminary technical meeting held in Washington at the end of July  at the 
request of the  Department of Energy,  an  American delegation returning from  Moscow 
will go  to Ispra at the end of September. 
The United States clearly stated its intention recently to step up the fight against this form 
of criminal behaviour.  At  the opening of the Moscow office of the  Federal Bureau of 
Investigation  (FBI), Louis Freeh,  director of the  FBI,  described efforts to  combat the 
traffic in nuclear materials as  a priority area of cooperation with the Russian authorities. 
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As regards customs matters, the fruitful contact between the Directorate-General for the 
Customs  Union  and  the  American  Customs  Administration  and  in  particular  the 
forthcoming signature of a customs cooperation agreement between the Union and the 
United States, should make it possible to gradually coordinate the respective endeavours 
of these  services  in  this connection.  This  is  likely  to  concern  in  particular  technical 
assistance  and  specific  training  to  be provided to  the  customs  administrations of the 
countries concerned. 
In general terms, going beyond the specific forms of cooperation already mentioned, the 
problem of the illicit nuclear traffic is expected to be on the agenda in connection with 
relations with third countries for which the Council meeting on Justice and Home Affairs 
is due to establish the framework shortly, on the basis of work in progress. 
In  view of this,  the  fact that the  Council Presidency,  at  the  request of the  European 
Council  in  Corfu,  put  this  question  on the  agenda of the  Conference  on  drugs  and 
organized crime held in Berlin on 8 September 1994, where the EU Member States, the 
Commission, the candidates for accession and Central and Eastern European  countries 
with association agreements were represented at ministerial level, certainly represents a 
significant first step. This matter will also be referred to other Council meetings and the 
informal Usedom meeting. 
Setting such cooperation in motion should eventually achieve concrete operational results, 
such as the identification of contact points in the third countries most directly affected by 
the origin, transit or destination of products,  and  the expansion of the role of liaison 
officers seconded to these countries by the police services of the Member States. 
* 
*  * 
15 C.  COOPERATION BE1WEEN THE MEMBER STATES 
Given the elimination of controls at borders between Member States, there is a need for 
greater cooperation between  Member States to  deal  with  this problem.  As  with  other 
threats currently  facing  the  Union  as  a  whole,  there  should be cooperation  at  several 
levels: 
- ( 1) the development of cooperation already established on an informal ad hoc basis by 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate; 
- (2) the development of customs cooperation between Member State administrations and 
between them and the Commission departments: 
- (3) in  the context of the cooperation structures established in  the field of justice and 
home affairs; 
- (4) the exchange of information on industrial cooperation. 
The complexity of the problem and the variety of players and instruments means that very 
intensive coonlination will be crucial for the success of any attempt to  put a stop to this 
traffic. 
In this connection, the setting up of an ad hoc Council working party, as proposed by the 
Presidency, would certainly be useful, particularly as  such a working party would be in 
a good position to make use of the considerable work carried out in the existing bodies. 
1.  COOPERATION IN THE CONTEXT OF EURATOM SAFEGUARDS 
Cooperation  between  Commission  departments  and  the  national  and  local  authorities 
affected by the problem has been highly successful. 
However, a new situation is emerging from the fact that, firstly, cases of illicit traffic are 
increasing  and,  secondly,  there  is  a  very  real  risk  that  such  activities  may  spread 
throughout the territory of the Union. 
The Commission is therefore of the opinion that informal cooperation on an ad hoc basis 
should be extended to  the Member States concerned. 
The  Commission  believes  that  only  concerted  and  in  some  cases  structured  action 
involving total cooperation with the territorial and judicial authorities will be capable of 
putting a stop to this illicit trade in  the Union. 
The possibility should be examined as to whether and for what specific area it would be 
beneficial to make use of Article 13 5 of the Euratom Treaty (consultations and setting up 
of committees by the Commission). 
16 Cooperation could cover the following fields, the objective being to monitor the materials 
and  achieve the  widest  possible  coordination,  without  prejudging at  this  stage  which 
authorities  should  be  responsible  for  inspections,  or  which  instruments  it  would  be 
desirable to mobilize: 
- prevention of illicit entry and transportation of materials into/within the Union; 
- seizure, transportation, storage of and access to illicit materials; 
- coordination of action; 
- identification of contacts in the Member States; 
- identification of contacts in third countries. 
*** 
2.  CUSTOMS COOPERATION 
The Member States' customs administrations are the first line of defence at the Union's 
external frontiers and will have a decisive role to play in the action to combat this traffic. 
Their activities can be divided into two main areas: 
( 1)  Tighter controls at the external frontiers 
There is a need for more uniform and more effective checks at the external frontiers.  In 
order to achieve more targeted customs controls, the Directorate-General for the Customs 
Union is endeavouring to develop tl-te  risk analysis technique through specific measures. 
In  addition,  in  1995  under the MATTHAEUS  programme there are  plans for  training 
schemes, seminars and exchanges between customs officials of the Member States with 
expertise in the combating of traffic in nuclear materials. 
(2)  Action to  combat illicit traffic 
In  the  case  of  materials  covered  by  the  EAEC  Treaty,  cooperation  between 
Member States, and between the latter and the  Commission is  based on the provisions 
governing  mutual  assistance  on  customs  matters  (Council  Regulation  1468  of 
19 May 1981). 
The  customs  information  system  (CIS)  administered  by  the  Commission  is  of vital 
importance  to  the  efforts  to  combat  illicit  traffic.  The  CIS  ensures  real-time 
communication between the 240 terminals installed in the frontier posts of  the Union and 
supplements the secure customs enforcement network (SCENT) whereby information is 
exchanged confidentially between the competent authorities in connection with suspected 
or established cases of illicit traffic. 
In  addition,  cooperation is  being  established  with  the customs authorities of the third 
countries  concerned by  this  traffic  on  the  basis of the  provisions  of the  cooperation, 
association  and  partnership  agreements  (where  mutual  administrative  assistance  is 
17 concerned)  and  in  the  PHARE  and  TACIS  framework  (where technical  assistance  is 
concerned, e.g.  training schemes and detection equipment). 
* * * 
3.  JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS 
As  the  Brussels  European  Council  emphasized,  the fact  that  all  questions  relating  to 
justice  and home affairs  cooperation  are  now  handled in  the  new  single  institutional 
framework, with a bigger role for the Commission and the Council Secretariat. will ensure 
greater  coherence  between  the  various  levels  of Community  or intergovemmental 
inte1Vention  - and will therefore  enhance  the  overall efficiency of the  action  of the 
Union. 
With  due  regard  for  the  institutional  balance  defined  by  Title  VI  of the  Treaty  on 
European  Union,  the  Commission  therefore  thinks  it  essential  to  bring  a  number  of 
considerations to the  Council's attention,  without it being able to  claim,  in  relation  to 
many of the points referred to, any  right of initiative under Article K.3. 
In  accordance with  Article K.l  of the  Treaty  on  European  Union, for  the  purposes of 
achieving  the  objectives  of the  Union  and  without  prejudice  to  the  powers  of the 
European Community, the Member States regard a number of areas as matters of common 
interest.  Of these, judicial cooperation in  criminal  matters,  customs cooperation  in  the 
non-harmonized  sectors,  and  police  cooperation  for  the  purpose  of preventing  and 
;:;ombating serious forms of international crime would appear to be the most concerned 
by  action  to  combat the  illicit  trade  in  nuclear  materials.  The possibility  of specific 
.nitiatives with a view to combating fraud on an international scale (Article K.l(5)) is also 
opened up  by Title VI of the Treaty on European Union. 
in the context of cooperation in the fields of  justice and home affairs, there would appear 
to  be a need, first and foremost, for measures of the type referred to in Article K.3( l) of 
!he  Treaty,  whereby  "Member States  shall inform  and consult one another ll'iThin  the 
!. 'ouncil  with  a  view  to  coordinating  their action.  To  that  end.  they  shall  establish 
;ol/ahoration between the  relevant departments of their administrations". 
if necessary,  these  measures  could  take  the  form  of joint action  "in  so far  as  the 
objectives (~f the Union can be attained better by joint action than  by the Member ,\'tales 
aciing  indit•idually,  on  account  of the  scale  or  effects  of the  action  envisaged" 
;Article K.3(2)(b).  If, on scrutiny of  national legislation, there would appear to be a need, 
the Member States could envisage concluding a convention on the subject, as mentioned 
below  The possibility should also  be borne in  mind of adopting joint positions which 
·Nould subsequently be expressed by the Member States in the international organizations 
and at  international conferences in  which  they participate. 
It  is  already  apparent  that  completion  of work  in  progress  in  the  context  of this 
cooperation, work which was assigned priority in the 1994 work programme adopted by 
the Justice and Home Affairs Council  on  30  November 1993, could make a significant 
contribution to  stepping up  the action to  combat this form of traffic. 
Among other things, this includes the adoption of  the Convention establishing a European 
information system, the implementation of various recommendations concerning actiOn 
18 to  combat  organized  international  crime,  as  approved by  the  Council  last  November, 
tougher action to combat the laundering of the proceeds of crime, scientific and technical 
research into this particular form of crime, the training of the members of the services 
concerned, and the speeding up and simplification of mutual assistance in judicial matters. 
This work should contribute in  particular to  three objectives which now seem essential 
in  order to  bring  the  situation  under  better control,  namely  a joint assessment of the 
phenomenon, the establishment of rapid communication networks, and the identification 
of partners in the Member States and within the Commission. 
Where customs cooperation is concerned, and without prejudice to  what was mentioned 
'above, special attention should be paid to the early finalization of the Convention on the 
customs  information  system  and  the  development  of a  control  strategy  at  external 
frontiers. 
As regards police cooperation, the Commission can only approve the possibility, currently 
under  consideration,  of extending  the  authority  of the  future  European  Police  Office 
(Europol) to the traffic in nuclear materials and radioactive substances, under the heading 
of "other serious forms of international crime"  with which the Office would be dealing 
under Article K.l (9) of the Treaty on  European Union. 
*** 
POSSIBLE FORMS OF COOPERATION 
I.  Illicit import and transport of nuclear materials 
For obvious practical  reasons,  the  first  stage  in  any  attempt  to  stop  this  illegal  trade 
would  be  to  prevent  nuclear  materials  and  radioactive  substances  from  entering  the 
territory  of the  Union  illegally.  This  is  mainly  the  task  of customs  cooperation,  as 
described above. 
This objective would be more easily achieved if the capacity of frontier posts (including 
airports)  outside the  Union  for  detecting  and  handling  such  materials  was  improved; 
special  equipment and training is necessary. 
Coordination of such efforts between the Member States would be sure to have a positive 
impact, for example by reducing the cost of  training and equipment, by organizing control 
exercises,  and  by  exchanging  information  on  the  identity  and  movements  of persons 
suspected of involvement in this trade. 
Once  materials  and  substances  are  brought  into  Community  territory,  handling  and 
transportation  thereof  are  covered  by  Community,  national  and  regional  rules  and 
regulations regarding radiation protection, under which prior notification and authorization 
are necessary.  Lack of such authorization makes these operations illegal, except where 
the level of radioactivity is very low. 
Penalties are provided for in cases where these regulations are not observed. Substantial 
differences in penalties between Member States could create the risk that materials would 
be channelled towards the States where legislation was less strict. It would therefore be 
desirable to see whether such differences exist and how great the need is for laws in  the 
19 Member  States  to  be  aligned  with  regard  to  illegal  imports  and  carriage  of nuclear 
materials. 
With this in mind, the legal instrument to be envisaged would no longer be joint action 
but the convention drawn up by the Council which "it shall recommend to the Member 
States for adoption in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements", based 
on  Article  K.3(2)(c).  This  convention  could be  established  in  the  context of judicial 
cooperation in criminal matters or police cooperation. 
II.  Access to materials held by the competent authorities 
If it appears that seized materials contain uranium or plutonium, the relevant provisions 
of the  Euratom Treaty  will  apply,  in  particular as  regards  safeguards.  The  competent 
Commission departments must therefore be informed thereof. If necessary, an inspector 
may  be sent to the scene to identify the materials. 
The materials seized may be transported to a national or Community research centre so 
that analyses may be carried out to identify, among other things, the exact origin of the 
materials. 
III.  Identification of contact points in the Member States 
Each Member State possesses its own structures for handling the different stages of an 
operation, such as seizure, storage of seized materials, etc., which involve various national 
or local authorities. Study of recent cases shows that there is a clear need to identify well-
defined,  rapid  channels  of  communication.  This  is  a  crucial  point  in  the  smooth 
functioning of the system. 
*** 
4.  COORDINATION OF INDUSTRIAL ASSISTANCE 
Several Member States have already embarked upon industrial cooperation in the nuclear 
field with certain CIS republics and certain Central and Eastern European countries.  The 
European  industry  wishes  to  establish  links  with  its  counterparts  and  very  often  the 
authorities  are  keen  to  facilitate  such  contacts.  In  addition,  the  European Union has 
launched assistance projects to improve the safety of nuclear installations, including fuel 
cycle installations. 
Clearly the presence of national or Community officials or industry representatives in an 
installation which proved to be the origin of illicit ·traffic would create a delicate situation. 
The industry  and the  authorities are  perfectly  aware of this  potential problem  and  are 
ready  to  take the action needed to  avoid it.  The cooperation of the local authorities is 
necessary, but they tend to make the same requests to several parties. 
The need for a degree of coordination therefore quickly became apparent.  The ESD and 
the  JRC  have reacted to  this  need.  In  June  the  JRC  held a first  meeting,  which  was 
20 attended by representatives of  the Member States' authorities and industries.  This meeting 
identified certain joint priority lines of action, particularly as regards the instrumentation 
needed. 
* 
*  * 
CONCLUSIONS 
The problem of  the illicit traffic in radioactive substances and nuclear materials is serious, 
complex  and of a  wide  geographical  range,  thus  necessitating  a  suitably  large-scale 
response. 
That response must involve the various instruments which can make a major contribution, 
each in its own legal context, but bearing in mind the common final objective. In the light 
of all  this,  a  European  Union  response  should  be  directed  towards  the  following 
objectives: 
(1)  The conditions of operation of the nuclear sector, i.e. nuclear safeguanls, in the 
countries  concerned  by  the  traffic  in certain  dangerous  materials  need  to  be 
improved. 
The  Commission  proposes  that  maximum  use  be  made  of the  possibilities  of the 
assistance programmes already operational in this area, and in particular: 
the assistance provided by the Euratom Safeguards Directorate; 
the technical assistance provided under the T ACIS programme, with the support 
of the Joint Research Centre; 
the Moscow-based Science and Technology Centre. 
In addition, the industrial assistance provided by the various donors and operators should 
be the subject of information and coordination. 
(2)  Everv effo•t must be made to ensure that the introduction of nuclear materials into 
the tenitorv of the European Union is stopped at the  Union's external frontiers. 
To this end: 
the  Commission  intends  to  strengthen  customs  cooperation,  with  the  aim  of 
boosting the  capacity  of the  services  responsible  for  preventing  and  detecting 
attempted illicit traffic; 
the possibilities offered by Title VI of the Treaty on the European Union (Justice 
and Home Affairs) should be explored and utilized to the full; 
the Euratom Safeguards Directorate and the Joint Research Centre will continue, 
as in  the past, to  place their expertise at the disposal of the national authorities 
confronted with this problem. 
21 (3)  The cooperation of all the States concerned is absolutely necessary. 
The Commission therefore considers that: 
all the possibilities for cooperation offered by the agreements already concluded, 
in  particular the partnership agreements and the Europe agreements,  should be 
exploited in order to  ensure a common  approach  to  the problem  and practical 
responses; 
future  agreements  should,  where  necessary,  include  provisions  to  enable  such 
cooperation to take place; 
in  the  context of the  common  external  and  security  policy,  the  possibility  of 
making  use  of the joint action  already  decided  upon  concerning nuclear non-
proliferation should be examined, as should any other action likely to help combat 
this traffic; 
close cooperation should be maintained or established with third countries likely 
to help combat this traffic, in  particular the United States. 
Only  a  comprehensive  response  will  make  it  possible  to  combat the  illicit  traffic  in 
nuclear  materials  effectively.  Hence  the  various  suggestions  contained  in  this 
communication should be looked at  by  the Council in such a way  as  to  guarantee the 
success of the integrated approach proposed by the Commission. 
Where the budgetary aspects are concerned, it should be noted that any Community action 
has to be examined in the context of the budget resources available. 
The Council and Parliament are invited to take note of this communication and support 
the suggestions it contains. 
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